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Abstract
This paper addresses the computational challenges of learning strong substitutes demand when given
access to a demand (or valuation) oracle. Strong substitutes demand generalises the well-studied
gross substitutes demand to a multi-unit setting. Recent work by Baldwin and Klemperer shows
that any such demand can be expressed in a natural way as a finite collection of weighted bid vectors.
A simplified version of this bidding language has been used by the Bank of England.
Assuming access to a demand oracle, we provide an algorithm that computes the unique list of
bids corresponding to a bidder’s demand preferences. In the special case where their demand can be
expressed using positive bids only, we have an efficient algorithm that learns the bids in linear time.
We also show super-polynomial lower bounds on the query complexity of computing the unique list
of bids in the general case where bids may be positive and negative. Our algorithms constitute the
first systematic approach for bidders to construct a bid list corresponding to non-trivial demand,
allowing them to participate in ‘product-mix’ auctions.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation → Computational pricing and auctions
Keywords and phrases learning demand, preference elicitation, bidding language, query protocol,
product-mix auction, strong substitutes
1 Introduction
The Product-Mix Auction [9, 10, 11] was devised by Klemperer as a means of providing
liquidity to commercial banks and has been used regularly by the Bank of England since 2011.
In it, there are a number of distinct products available in multiple discrete units, and a set
of buyers who express strong substitutes demands amongst these products1. Given strong
substitutes constraints on the total quantity of goods available, it is possible to compute
market-clearing prices and allocations, in the sense that all buyers receive an allocation
that they demand at those prices, and all goods are sold. The strong substitutes property
guarantees the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Importantly for the present paper, the auction uses a bidding language in which buyers
express their demands in terms of lists of bids, where each bid consists of a price vector
(one price for each good) and a weight. Any bid b is understood as a willingness to buy
some quantity of goods (the weight of b), and for each good i a price bi is offered. A bid is
rejected if all prices offered are lower than the market-clearing prices of the corresponding
goods, otherwise it is accepted on some good that maximises the price offered minus the
market-clearing price. The auction currently run by the Bank of England only permits
1 In the banking context, products correspond to liquidity secured against alternatives kinds of collateral;
the values of bids correspond to interest rates offered by the commercial banks.
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2 Learning Strong Substitutes Demand via Queries
bidders to submit bids with one non-zero vector entry and positive weights, and any such
collection of such positive bids has the strong substitutes property. It has subsequently
been shown that any strong-substitutes demand function can be uniquely represented as a
collection of bids with positive and negative weights [2].
While this gives the buyer a general-purpose means of communicating any strong substi-
tutes demand, the buyer faces the problem of expressing her demand in this language. It
may be easier for a buyer to answer queries of the form “what bundle would you demand,
given the following per-unit prices of goods?”. In this paper, we develop query protocols that
assist a buyer in constructing her demand function based on a sequence of queries. Given an
unknown demand function, the algorithm is assumed to have access to a demand oracle: for
any given prices for goods, the algorithm can learn a bundle of goods demanded at those
prices. We are interested in minimising the number of queries to the demand oracle.
1.1 Our Contributions
This paper addresses the computational challenges of learning strong substitutes demand
when given access to a demand oracle. Under the mild assumption that bidders are able
to answer questions of the form “What bundle do you demand at the following per-unit
prices?”, our algorithms constitute the first systematic approach for bidders to generate a bid
list corresponding to their demand, allowing them to participate in Product-Mix Auctions
with non-trivial demand preferences. We provide upper and lower bounds on the query
complexity of learning demand preferences and expressing these using the bidding language
of the Product-Mix Auction, which is able to encode any strong substitutes demand in a
conceptually simple and natural fashion.
Section 2 outlines three complementary characterisations of the strong substitutes property
and introduces the bidding language both algebraically and geometrically. A first result of
this paper, given in Section 3, is to show that demand oracles are not unreasonably powerful:
when given access instead to a valuation oracle, it is possible to simulate a demand oracle in
polynomial time and queries.
In Sections 4 and 5, we consider algorithms that learn the unique bid list corresponding
to a bidder’s demand. The algorithm in Section 4 learns demands that can be represented
by lists of positive bids, and has linear query complexity. In the setting where demand may
require positive and negative bids to express, we provide an exponential-cost algorithm that
proceeds by learning all hyperplanes that contain facets of the Locus of Indifference Prices
(LIP), a geometric object introduced in [3] to characterise demand.
Finally, in Section 6 we consider lower bounds on the query complexity of learning bid
lists. We note briefly that Ω(B logM) queries are required to learn a list of B positive bids,
where M is the magnitude of the bid vectors w.r.t. the L∞ norm. In order to identify the
dependence on the number of goods n, we construct an adversarial game using a novel ‘island
gadget’ consisting of positive and negative bids. Crucially, the island gadget only changes
demand in a local region. For fixed n, we identify the overall query complexity of learning
bid lists corresponding to strong substitutes demand as Θ(B logM +Bn).
1.2 Related Work
Our work relates to the theory of preference elicitation. In this setting, a centralised agent,
such as an auctioneer, wishes to identify an optimal allocation of goods via queries to
participants’ preferences. Queries typically take the form of value queries, where an agent
reports a valuation for a given bundle of goods, or demand queries, where an agent reports a
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bundle that is demanded at given prices. This paper focuses on using demand queries to learn
the bid list representation of strong substitutes demand preferences. This representation can
then be used to compute an optimal allocation of goods to agents via the methods of [1].
Much early work in preference elicitation highlights the deep connections to exact learning
via membership and equivalence queries from computational learning theory, and our results
can also be viewed through this lens. Some notable examples include [21, 4]. The authors
of [5] explore the use of ranking oracles to exploit the topological structure of bidder
preferences to learn optimal allocations. This approach is extended in [6, 7], and verified
empirically in [8]. The authors of [16] explore the communication complexity of preference
elicitation in combinatorial auctions, where they show that for general valuations, finding
a value-maximising allocation requires an exponential communication cost in the number
of items. In [12], the authors explore connections between preference elicitation and exact
learning, but they demonstrate that the representation length of the valuation is an important
parameter in the query complexity of computing optimal allocations. This dependence on
the representation length provides a way of side-stepping lower bounds from [16], and further
justifies the need for succinct yet expressive bidding languages, as explored further in [15].
Our problem is conceptually similar to a problem studied recently in [20], in which the
authors also consider algorithms with access to demand queries, and attempt to learn the
underlying valuation that gives rise to the demand correspondence. The main difference
between their work and ours however is that they consider a different class of value functions.
In [20], there are n goods, each in unit supply (whereas we allow multiple copies of goods),
and the buyer wants at most k goods, and has additive valuations (whereas our strong
substitutes valuations are more general).
2 Preliminaries
For notational convenience, we denote [n] := {1, . . . , n} and [n]0 := {0, . . . , n}. In our auction
model, there are n distinct goods numbered from 1 to n; a single copy of a good is an item.
A bundle of goods, typically denoted by x or y in this paper, is a vector in Zn+ whose i-th
entry denotes the number of items of good i. Vectors p, q ∈ Rn typically denote vectors
of prices, with a price entry for each of the n goods. We write p ≤ q when the inequality
holds component-wise. As we will see below, it is often convenient to work with a notional
reject good for which prices are always zero. Letting the reject good be 0, the set of goods is
then [n]0 and we identify bundles and prices with the n+ 1-dimensional vectors obtained
by adding a 0-th entry of value 0. For any subset X ⊆ [n], eX denotes the characteristic
vector of X, i.e. an n-dimensional vector whose i-th entry is 1 if i ∈ X, and 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, ei denotes the vector whose i-th entry is 1 and other entries are 0.
2.1 Strong-Substitutes Demand Preferences
Throughout, we assume that bidders have quasi-linear strong substitutes demand. We
introduce the strong substitutes property using the canonical definition and then describe
two complementary approaches to characterising strong substitutes demand correspondences
that draw from tropical geometry and discrete convex analysis, respectively.
We assume that bidders have an implicit valuation v : A→ R for bundles of goods, where
A ⊂ Zn+ is a finite set. This is equivalent to defining the valuation as v : Zn → R, where
R := R∪{−∞} denotes the partially extended reals, and we assume that the effective domain
dom v = {x ∈ Zn | v(x) > −∞} of v is finite and non-negative in the sense that x ≥ 0 for
all x ∈ dom v. Moreover, bidders have quasi-linear utilities, i.e. the utility they derive from
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Figure 1 Left: An illustration of a strong-substitutes demand correspondence with two goods,
partitioning price space into piecewise-linear convex regions. Each region is labelled with the bundle
demanded at prices in the region. The dashed lines comprise the Locus of Indifference Prices (LIP).
Right: Six positive (solid) and two negative (hollow) bids are required to express this demand.
bundle x at prices p is u(x;p) := v(x)− p · x. A bidder’s demand correspondence Dv maps
prices p to the set of bundles x that maximise u(x;p) for this p.
I Definition 1 (cf. [13]). A demand correspondence Dv is ordinary substitutes if, for any
prices p′ ≥ p with Dv(p) = {x} and Dv(p′) = {x′}, we have x′k ≥ xk for all k such
that pk = p′k. Dv is strong substitutes (SS) if, when we consider all units of goods to be
separate goods, Dv is ordinary substitutes.
Our definition is equivalent to the definition of Milgrom and Strulovici [13]. The SS
property is appealing because it is a generalisation of gross substitutes (GS) from the single-
unit setting that guarantees the existence of a competitive equilibrium in multi-unit auction
markets. We refer to Shioura and Tamura [18] for a detailed discussion on SS, and the
distinction between GS and SS.
2.1.1 Geometric Approach
We give some geometric intuition for strong substitutes demand correspondences that
underpins the algorithmic ideas in this paper. It is well-known that any quasi-linear demand
divides price space into piecewise-linear convex regions corresponding to bundles. When
demand is SS, each such region is a convex lattice [14]. Figure 1 illustrates this.
Recently, Baldwin and Klemperer [3] proposed a new way of characterising demand types.
Borrowing from the tropical geometry literature, they introduce the Locus of Indifference
Prices (LIP), a piecewise-linear geometric object consisting of the set of all prices at which
the bidder is indifferent between two or more bundles. They show that the LIP corresponds
in a natural way to a polyhedral complex with n− 1-dimensional facets. In Figure 1, the LIP
is drawn using dashed lines. Noting that the orientation of the separating facet between two
adjacent demand regions characterises how demand changes when moving from one region
to the other, Baldwin and Klemperer [3] propose a new way of defining demand types by the
set of facet-normal vectors of the LIP. In this new paradigm, the strong substitutes demand
type is defined as the family of demand correspondences whose LIP facets are normal to
ei or ei − ej for some i, j ∈ [n]. In two dimensions, facets of SS LIPs are either horizontal,
vertical or normal to (1,−1). Hence it follows directly from this definition that the demand
correspondence in Figure 1 enjoys the strong substitutes property.
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2.1.2 Discrete Convex Analysis
A ‘price-free’ characterisation of the strong substitutes property using the language of
discrete convex optimisation is given by Shioura and Tamura [18]. A function f : Zn → R is
called M \-concave if it satisfies the following exchange property. For any x,y ∈ dom f and
i ∈ supp+(x− y), there exists j ∈ supp−(x− y) ∪ {0} such that
f(x) + f(y) ≤ f(x− ei + ej) + f(y + ei − ej). (1)
Here we define e0 = 0, and the positive and negative support of a vector z ∈ Zn as
supp+(z) = {i ∈ [n] | zi > 0} and supp−(z) = {i ∈ [n] | zi < 0}.
I Theorem 2 ([18, Theorem 4.1]). A quasi-linear demand correspondence Du is strong
substitutes if and only if its valuation u is M \-concave.
M \-concave functions are closely related to M -concave functions, which satisfy the
exchange property (1) for some non-zero j ∈ supp−(x−y). Every n-dimensionalM \-concave
function can be obtained as the projection of an n + 1-dimensional M -concave function
onto an n-dimensional hyperplane. Conversely, we can obtain the corresponding M -concave
function fˆ of an M \-concave function f as
fˆ(x0,x) =
{
f(x) if x0 = −
∑
i∈[n] xi,
−∞ otherwise, (2)
where (x0,x) ∈ Zn+1 is an n + 1-dimensional vector. For details on M \- and M -concave
functions, we refer to Murota [14].
2.2 The Bidding Language
The Product-Mix Auction introduces a novel bidding language that allows us to express every
strong substitutes demand with a finite list B of positive and negative bids. A bid consists of
an n-dimensional integral vector b ∈ Zn and a weight w(b) = ±1. When working with the
notional reject good 0 introduced above, we identify a bid vector b with the n+1-dimensional
vector obtained by adding a 0-th entry of value 0. Without loss of generality, we restrict
ourselves to positive and negative unit weights w(b) ∈ {−1, 1}, as any bid with a weight of
w(b) ∈ Z can be represented by w(b) unit bids with the same vector and sign.
For each bid b, we can understand bi as the amount that b is willing to spend on
good i. Suppose the auctioneer sets prices p. The bid is rejected at p if bi < pi for all
goods i. Otherwise, the bid demands a good i ∈ [n] that maximises bi − pi at price p. The
notational ‘reject’ good 0 simplifies notation: recalling that we defined b0 = 0 = p0, we say
that b demands good i ∈ [n]0 if i ∈ argmaxi∈[n]0(bi − pi), and receiving the ‘reject’ good
is equivalent to the bid being rejected. If the set of demanded goods argmaxi∈[n]0 (bi − pi)
at p contains more than one good, we say that b is indifferent between these goods at p.
(In particular, a bid may be indifferent between demanding goods and being rejected when
maxi∈[n]0(bi − pi) = 0). A price p is marginal if there are bids indifferent between goods
at p, and non-marginal otherwise.
We can now introduce the demand correspondence DB(p) for a bid list B as follows.
If p is non-marginal, the unique bundle demanded at p is obtained by adding w(b) items
of i(b) to the bundle for each b ∈ B, where i(b) is the unique good that b demands at p.
If p is marginal, DB(p) consists of the discrete convex hull of the bundles demanded at
non-marginal prices arbitrarily close to p, where the discrete convex hull of a set of bundles
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X is defined as conv(X) ∩ Z. In general, this implies that we cannot independently allocate
to each bid one of the goods it demand, as this may result in bundles that are not in DB(p).
Baldwin and Klemperer [2] show that any strong substitutes demand correspondence Dv
can be represented as a finite list B of positive and negative bids such that Dv(p) = DB(p)
for all prices p, and this representation is essentially unique (if we restrict ourselves to
positive and negative bids of unit weight). The bids in Figure 1 (right) represent the strong
substitutes demand shown in Figure 1 (left). Conversely, however, not all lists of positive
and negative bids induce a strong substitutes demand correspondence; we call a bid list valid
if it does. Theorem 3, taken from [1], gives a criterion that allows us to check validity. It is
known that the problem of deciding the validity of a bid list is coNP-complete [1].
I Theorem 3. A bid list is valid if and only if the weights of the bids indifferent between i
and i′ at p sum to a non-negative number, for all p ∈ Rn and i, i′ ∈ [n]0.
A special subclass of the strong substitutes demand type is the family of demand
correspondences that can be expressed using only positive bids. This family is of particular
practical interest, as the Bank of England currently runs the Product-Mix Auction with
positive bids only. Note that any list of positive bids is valid, as it trivially satisfies Theorem 3.
2.3 The Geometry of Bids
In the previous section, we explained the algebraic relationship between a bid list and
its resulting demand correspondence. Here we highlight the geometry of such a demand
correspondence, as this forms the basis of our algorithms.
Fix a bid b ∈ Zn and an item i ∈ [n]0. We let Ri denote the set of prices at which b
demands good i. Each Ri is an unbounded convex polytope in Rn, which can be expressed
succinctly as Ri = b +Hi, where Hi is the conic hull of the vectors ej , j ∈ [n]0 \ {i}, if we
define e0 = −e[n] (see Figure 2). Note that each Ri is of full affine dimension and the Ri
together cover the entirety of Rn. In line with the previous section, b is indifferent between
two goods i, j ∈ [n]0 at p if and only if p ∈ Ri ∩Rj . Moreover, if a price lies in the interior of
any given Ri, good i is the unique good demanded by b. For a given list of bids B, we recall
that a price p is non-marginal if each bid in B demands a unique item at p. If we define
Rji := bj +Hi for each bj ∈ B, then it is straightforward to see that p is non-marginal if and
only if it does not lie on the boundary of any Rji . This allows us to describe the geometry of
the demand correspondence DB. Suppose that p is non-marginal, and that for each b ∈ B,
i(b) is the unique good demanded by b at p. We recall that the unique bundle demanded at
p is obtained by adding w(b) items of good i(b) for each b ∈ B. We can express this as
DB(p) =
∑
(i,j):
p∈Rj
i
w(bj)ei.
This is illustrated in Figure 2. We extend the definition of DB to marginal prices as above:
if p is marginal, DB(p) is the discrete convex hull of the bundles demanded at non-marginal
prices arbitrarily close to p.
2.3.1 Valid Bid Lists
As mentioned above, not all demand correspondences DB arising from bid lists encode a
quasi-linear, strong substitutes demand correspondence Dv as defined in Section 2.1. To
obtain SS demand, the bid list must satisfy the property given in Theorem 3. Here we
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Figure 2 Left: The demand regions Ri of a single positive bid b in the case of two goods 1, 2 and
the reject good 0. Right: a three-element bid list B = {b1, b2, b3}. The price vector p (marked by a
red cross) lies in R11, R20, and R32. Hence, at prices p, the bid b1 demands good 1, b2 is rejected, and
b3 demands good 2. Putting this together, DB(p) = (1, 1).
explore what validity means geometrically. Suppose that B is a bid list, and for any given
price p, define the (i, `)-support suppi,`(p) of p to be the set of all bids bj ∈ B such that
p ∈ Rji ∩Rj` . In other words, all bids that are indifferent between goods i and ` at price p.
This allows us to give a condition for non-validity of our bid list B. In particular, B is valid
if and only if
∑
b∈suppi,`(p) w(b) ≥ 0 for all prices p and pairs of goods i, ` ∈ [n]0.
2.4 The Computational Challenges
Consider a bidder who has an (unknown) strong substitutes demand correspondence Dv
on n goods. We study the problem of learning the unique list B of positive and negative bids
of unit weight that represent a bidder’s demand correspondence, i.e. such that Dv = DB. We
consider algorithms that learn B by querying the demand correspondence Dv at different price
vectors. More specifically, our algorithms have access to an adversarial demand oracle QB;
given any price vector p, QB(p) returns a bundle from DB(p). A bidder may demand multiple
bundles at some price (i.e. when |DB(p)| > 1), in which case the adversarial oracle simply
returns a single demanded bundle at that price, and we have no control over which such
bundle is returned. Another related setting we address in Section 3 is the complexity of
learning B given access to a valuation oracle, i.e. given a bundle x, the bidder reports their
valuation v(x) for this bundle.
Let B := |B| be the number of bids we wish to learn, and M := maxb∈B ‖b‖∞ be the
magnitude of the bids w.r.t to the L∞ norm. We are interested in the query complexity of
learning B, measured in terms of n, B and logM . Note that nB logM bits are required to
store the bid list B, under the natural assumption that bid vectors are encoded in binary.
2.5 Initial Observations
Suppose B is the unknown bid list of a bidder. Note that we can determine M with O(logM)
demand queries, as M corresponds to the smallest value m such that the bidder demands
the empty bundle at price vector p = me[n], which can be found using binary search.
It is also straightforward to determine the sum of the weights of all bids,
∑
b∈B w(b), with
a single query to QB at prices p = −e1. Indeed, suppose x = QB(p) is a bundle returned by
the demand oracle. No bid b demands the reject good at p, as b1 − p1 ≥ 1. Moreover, each
bid b contributes w(b) items to the bundle x, so that
∑
b∈B w(b) =
∑
i∈[n] xi. If B contains
only positive unit bids, this is equivalent to counting the number of bids B.
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3 Simulating QB with a Valuation Oracle
In this section we show that demand oracles are not unreasonably powerful, in the sense
that we can use a valuation oracle to simulate a demand oracle with polynomial overhead.
Consider the setting where we are given query access to a bidder’s valuation function v. We
show that a single query to QB can be simulated with a polynomial number of queries to a
valuation oracle. This result utilises the equivalence of the strong substitutes property and
M \-convexity from the discrete convex analysis literature.
Recall that the utility of bundle x at prices p is given by u(x;p) = v(x)−p ·x. We define
up := u(·;p) for convenience. In order to simulate a demand oracle on input p, we wish
to compute a bundle x ∈ Dv that maximises up(x). Note that we can compute up(x) for
any bundle x using a single query to the valuation oracle. In order to compute a maximiser
of up(·), we draw from the discrete convex analysis literature. Firstly, we see that up is
M \-concave. Indeed, it is well-known that strong substitutes valuations are M \-concave [18]
and subtracting a linear term preserves this property. Secondly, let uˆ be the corresponding
M -concave function to up as defined in (2). We see that maximising up is equivalent to
maximising uˆ. Moreover, we can compute uˆ(x0,x) using at most one query to the valuation
oracle. Thirdly, note that we have ‖x‖1 ≤ B for any bundle x that the bidder demands, as
every bid b ∈ B contributes at most one item to x.
Murota [14, Chapter 10] provides various algorithms for maximisingM -concave functions f
with bounded effective domains dom f . The simplest such algorithm, a straightforward
steepest descent method, finds a maximiser with O(n2L) queries, where L := max{‖x− y‖1 |
x, y ∈ dom f}. In our setting, we have L = B, yielding a query complexity of O(n2B).
This query complexity can be improved to O(n3 log(B/n)) by applying the more involved
algorithms for maximising M -concave functions given in [17] and [19].
4 Learning Positive-Weighted Bids
In this section we assume that the bidder’s demand correspondence can be expressed by a list
of positive bids. Our algorithm learns a list of B positive bids using O(nB logM) demand
queries. This is close to our lower bound of Ω(B logM) given in Theorem 13 below.
We proceed by repeatedly finding a bid and ‘removing’ it, thereby reducing the size of the
remaining demand correspondence until all bids have been found. Let L denote the subset of
bids from B that have already been learnt, and let B′ := B − L be the list of remaining bids.
We can simulate a demand oracle QB′(p) for the demand correspondence associated with B′
as follows. At price vector p, first determine a bundle x demanded by all bids in B with a
single query QB(p), and then subtract from x a bundle y demanded at p by the bids in L.2
In this way, the problem of learning a list of positive bids reduces to repeatedly identifying
a single bid. In the next section, we describe a subroutine that learns the location of a single
bid in B′ using O(n logM) queries. As this subroutine is called B times, this yields an overall
query complexity of O(nB logM) for learning all bids in B. Recall from Section 2.5 that we
can compute M with O(logM) queries and B with a single query.
2 Note that B′ is valid, as lists of positive bids are always valid. If B consisted of positive and negative
bids, removing a single positive bid might result in a bid list that is no longer valid. In this case, the
algorithm described in this section may fail and return points not corresponding to bid locations.
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4.1 Finding a Single Positive Bid
We present an algorithm that performs binary searches using delta queries to successively
learn the coordinates x1, x2, . . . of a bid location x. We begin by defining delta queries and
establishing some fundamental facts about the results returned by these queries.
I Definition 4. A delta query ∆(q) at q ∈ Zn consists of two queries q+ and q− defined by
q+ = q′ + 12n and q− = q′ − 12n , where
q′ := q +
∑
i∈{2,...,n}
1
2(n− i+ 1)e
i.
The return value of the delta query is defined as ∆(q) = x−1 − x+1 , where x+ and x− are the
bundles of goods uniquely demanded at q+ and q−.
Note that q+1 = q1 + 12n and q
−
1 = q1 − 12n , and the two query points q+ and q− agree
on all other coordinates i ≥ 2. Secondly, q± is non-marginal by construction, so any bid
b ∈ Zn uniquely demands some good i at q±. The intuition behind delta queries is as follows.
Consider the hyperplane normal to e1 that contains q. In a first step, we carefully perturb q
such that the resulting point q′ remains on the hyperplane and no bid is indifferent between
any two goods in {2, . . . , n}. The points q− and q+ are then obtained by perturbing q′ in
directions ±e1 such that the prices become non-marginal.
Lemma 5 makes the observation that bids b satisfying b1 = q1 and b ≤ q demand good 1
at q− and are rejected at q+, while all other bids demand the same good at both prices q±.
Hence demand changes only in terms of good 1, and ∆(q) captures the magnitude of this
change. In our current setting where all bids have positive unit weight, Corollary 6 notes
that this is equivalent to counting the number of bids b that satisfy b1 = q1 and b ≤ q(S).
Our algorithm exploits this fact in order to learn the coordinates of a bid location.
I Lemma 5. Suppose we place a delta query at q ∈ Zn. Then any bid b ∈ Zn demands
different goods at q− and q+ if and only if b1 = q1 and b ≤ q′. Specifically, such a bid
demands an item of good 1 at q− and an item of the reject good 0 at q+.
Proof. Suppose b is a bid with b1 = q1 and b ≤ q′. As b is integral, we have bi < q+i = q−i
for all goods i ≥ 2, which implies that b can only demand goods 0 or 1 at q− and q+. At
q−, bid b uniquely demands good 1, as we have b1 − q−1 = 12n > 0. Similarly, we see that b
uniquely demands the reject good 0 at q+, as b1 − q+1 = − 12n < 0.
Conversely, suppose b demands distinct goods i and j at q− and q+, respectively. We
show that we must have i = 1 and j = 0 by excluding all other possibilities. Suppose
first that i = 0 and j ≥ 1. Then 0 > bj − q−j and 0 < bj − q+j . For j ≥ 2, this is a
contradiction as q−j = q+j . For j = 1, this similarly implies the contradiction bj − qj < −12n
and bj − qj > 12n . Now suppose i = 1 and j ≥ 2. Then bj − qj < bi − q−i = bi − qi + 12n and
similarly bj − qj > bi− qi− 12n . It follows that bi− qi− 12n < bj − qj < bi− qi + 12n . As bi− qi
is integral and bj − qj ∈ Z− 12(n−j+1) , this leads to a contradiction. Letting i, j ≥ 2 leads to
a contradiction in a similar way.
Now that we know that b demands i = 1 at q− and j = 0 at q+, it follows that
q1 − 12n = q−1 < b1 < q+1 = q1 + 12n , which implies q1 = b1 as b is integral. Finally, we have
bk < q
+
k = qk for all k ≥ 2, as b uniquely demands the reject good 0 at q+k . J
I Corollary 6. ∆(q) counts the number of bids b ∈ B that satisfy b1 = q1 and b ≤ q.
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Algorithm 1 Learning Positive Bids
1: Find the largest price p on L1 at which demand for good 1 is positive and set x1 = p1.
2: for i = 2 . . . n do
3: Find the smallest price p on Li at which ∆(p) > 0 and set xi = pi.
4: return (x1, . . . , xn)
4.1.1 The Algorithm
Algorithm 1 learns the position x of a single positive bid with O(n logM) queries.
The algorithm determines the value of xi, i ∈ [n], by performing a binary search on line
segment Li := {(x1, . . . , xi−1, z,M, . . . ,M) | 0 ≤ z ≤M}, where the values of x1, . . . , xi−1
have already been determined and are fixed. As the points in Li are well-ordered, we can
let si := (x1, . . . , xi−1, 0,M, . . . ,M) and li := (x1, . . . , xi−1,M . . . ,M) denote the ‘smallest’
and ‘largest’ points on Li.
In a first step, Algorithm 1 performs binary search on L1 in order to find the largest
point at which demand for good 1 is positive. Note that at any p ∈ L1, no bid demands
items of good i ≥ 2, i.e. every bid demands an item of good 0 or 1 (or is indifferent between
the two). Moreover, the function mapping prices p on L1 to the demand of good 1 at p is
monotonically decreasing and changes only at integral points, as the bids are integral. As B
items of good 1 are demanded at s1, there is a largest price p∗ ∈ L1 at which demand is
positive. Hence, we can find p∗ using binary search on L1 by querying demand at O(logM)
prices of the form (k − 12 ,M, . . . ,M) with k ∈ [M ]0.
The second kind of binary search uses delta queries to find the smallest point p∗ for each
line segment Li, i ≥ 2, at which ∆(p∗) is positive. Suppose i ≥ 2. Corollary 6 implies that
∆(q) restricted to the line Li is monotonically increasing. We show in the proof of Theorem 8
that the invariant ∆(li) > 0 holds when we perform binary search on Li. Moreover, ∆ only
changes in value at integral points along Li, so we can perform binary search to find p∗ with
O(logM) delta queries at prices (x1, . . . , xi−1, k,M, . . . ,M), where k ∈ [M ]0.
Theorem 8 establishes the correctness and running time of Algorithm 1. The proof
proceeds by induction and makes use of Observation 7.
I Observation 7. Let i ≥ 2. Suppose Algorithm 1 has successfully determined the first
i− 1 coordinates x1, . . . , xi−1 and binary search (using delta queries) finds the smallest point
p = (x1, . . . , xi,M, . . . ,M) on Li at which ∆(p) > 0. By Corollary 6, (a) none of the bids
b ∈ B satisfy b ≤ p and bi < pi, and (b) there is at least one bid b with b ≤ p and bi = pi.
I Theorem 8. Algorithm 1 returns the location of a bid using O(n logM) queries.
Proof. First we show that the algorithm is able to find 0 ≤ xi ≤M at every step. This is
clear for x1, as outlined above. To show that the binary search on Li using delta queries
finds xi, it suffices to show that ∆(li) is positive. Fix i ≤ 2 and suppose the algorithm
has found x1, . . . , xi−1. If p is the point found by binary searching on line Li−1, then
Observation 7 (b) tells us that there is at least one bid b satisfying b1 = p1 and b ≤ p.
Moreover, we have p1 = li1 and p ≤ li by construction. By transitivity and Corollary 6, it
follows that ∆(li) > 0.
Next, we prove that the vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) returned by the algorithm is the location
of a bid. By Observation 7 (b) and construction of xn, we know that there is a bid b∗ that
satisfies b∗ ≤ x and b∗n = xn. On the other hand, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, the construction
of xi together with Observation 7 (a) implies that no bid b satisfies b ≤ x and bi < xi. As a
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result, we get b∗i = xi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and it follows that b∗ lies at point x. Finally, to see
that the algorithm has query complexity O(n logM), note that it performs n binary searches
along lines Li, each of which incurring O(logM) queries. J
5 Learning Positive and Negative Bids
In this section, we provide an algorithm for learning valid bid lists that may contain both
positive and negative bids. Recall from Section 2.1.1 that the demand correspondence of a
SS demand (and hence of a valid bid list) corresponds to a polyhedral complex over price
space, the LIP, where the boundaries between unique demand regions are n− 1-dimensional
facets. Our algorithm learns the collection of all hyperplanes that contain these facets, as
well as each vertex arising from the intersection of n such hyperplanes. We note that every
bid must lie at a vertex but, conversely, not every such vertex contains a bid. In order to
check for existence of a bid at a vertex, we introduce super queries. These super queries,
applied at integral points p, provide complete information about the demand correspondence
in the local neighbourhood of p. This also allows us to perform a principled search for new
hyperplanes: at each iteration of the algorithm, either the local information around two
vertices points us in the direction of a new hyperplane, or we have succeeded in learning all
hyperplanes, and thus all bids.
5.1 Super Queries
Suppose p ∈ Zn is an integral price vector. We show that it is possible to obtain complete
knowledge of DB(p′) for all prices p′ with ‖p− p′‖∞ < 1 using a super query, which consists
of a specific set of demand queries at non-marginal query points in the vicinity of p defined
as follows. Intuitively, this works because bid vectors are integral and facets of an SS LIP
can only have specific orientations. Super queries are used by our algorithm in two ways:
firstly to determine the existence of a bid at a given integral point p, and secondly to provide
information that leads to a new separating hyperplane.
Let U1(p), . . . , U2n(p) be all the orthants of the unit L∞-ball around p. Each orthant
is a hypercube that can be triangulated into n! simplices (one for each permutation of the
coordinates [n]). We denote these simplices for the i-th orthant by U1i (p), . . . , Un!i (p).
I Definition 9. A super query at p ∈ Zn is a collection SQ(p) of representative prices from
the interior of each U ji (p), where i ∈ [2n] and j ∈ [n!].
With a slight abuse of notation, we say that we ‘super query’ a price vector p if we query
all price vectors in SQ(p).
I Lemma 10. Querying the points in SQ(p) once is sufficient to ascertain DB(p′) for any p′
with ‖p− p′‖∞ < 1. With this information, we can learn all facets of the LIP containing p,
as well as determining the existence of a bid (along with its weight) at p.
Proof. Suppose that p′ is such that ‖p − p′‖∞ < 1. From construction, it follows that
p′ ∈ U ji (p) for some U ji (p). However, we also know that facets in the polyhedral complex
resulting from DB can only be orthogonal to a unit vector (ei for some i), or vectors of the
form ei−ej for some i, j ∈ [n]. As a consequence, any price in the interior of U ji (p) demands
the same unique bundle. If p′ also lies in the interior of U ji (p), then we know the bundle it
demands and we are done. On the other hand, if p′ is on the boundary U ji (p), then it could
be marginal, but if this is the case, from construction, we know all bundles demanded at
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non-marginal prices neighbouring p′, as they must lie in the interior of other U j
′
i′ (p). This in
turn implies that we can infer all bundle demanded at p′ as desired.
The fact that SQ(p) holds all information regarding facets containing p is immediately
obvious from the specific orientations facets in can take in a SS demand correspondence.
As for the second point, suppose that there is a bid, b at p of weight k 6= 0. Let A be
the interior of the conic hull of (e2, ..., en). It follows that for prices along p + A, bid b is
only indifferent between the reject good 0 and k copies of good 1 (as well as all discrete
convex combinations of these two bundles). Now let us suppose that B is the interior of the
conic hull of (−e2, e3, ..., en). It follows that for prices along p+B, bid b uniquely demands
good k copies of good 2. On the other hand, suppose that there is no bid at p. If we let
B∞1 (p) be the unit L∞-ball around p, then it follows that prices at B∞1 (p) ∩ (A+ p) and
B∞1 (p) ∩ (B + p) demand the same collection of bundles. In either case, a super query gives
us all information regarding DB(p) in B∞1 (p), hence we are able to distinguish establish the
existence of a bid at p along with its weight if does exist. J
5.2 Finding a Separating Hyperplane
Suppose 0 ≤ q, q′ ≤ (M + 1)e[n] are distinct price vectors in the interior of different demand
regions. Note that ‖q − q′‖∞ ≤M + 1. As demand regions are convex and have piecewise-
linear boundaries, there exists some facet F of the LIP separating q and q′. In order to
find the hyperplane containing F , we perform O(logM) steps of binary search on conv(q, q′)
to obtain a point p that is within ε = 1/4 (w.r.t. the L∞ norm) of the closest point to q
at which demand differs from demand at q. Hence by construction, the L∞-ball B∞ε (p) of
radius ε at p intersects F . Let p′ be the point obtained from p by rounding each entry to
the nearest integer. Then it follows that F also intersects B∞
ε+ 12
(p′). Moreover, the geometry
of integral bids implies that any facet intersecting B∞
ε+ 12
(p′) must contain p′. Hence we can
learn F , and the hyperplane containing F , with a single super query at p′. In total, we see
that finding a separating hyperplane costs O (logM + 2nn!) queries.
5.3 The Main Algorithm
Algorithm 2 learns bid lists that may comprise positive and negative bids. The algorithm
maintains a set of hyperplanes H that it has learnt. We initialise H with all the axis-aligned
hyperplanes containing 0 and M . The algorithm also keeps track of the corresponding
set of vertices V arising from intersections of hyperplanes in H, the set of query points
Q = ⋃v∈V SQ(v), as well as the set of polytopes P of the subdivision of Rn by the hyperplanes
in H. Finally, Bˆ denotes the set of bids that the algorithm has learnt. We say that q, q′ ∈ Q
are hyperplane witnesses if they lie in the same polytope P ∈ P but have different demand.
We now argue that Algorithm 2 is well-defined and learns a bid list in O(Bn2) iterations
by identifying all the hyperplanes containing a facet of the LIP. As each bid gives rise to at
most O(n2) facets, the total number of such hyperplanes is O(Bn2). The algorithm learns
a new hyperplane in each iteration, as hyperplane witnesses lie in the same polytope by
definition, which implies that Step 5 of the algorithm finds a new hyperplane that is not
in H. Moreover, every bid must lie at the intersection of n such hyperplanes, and we perform
a super query at each intersection to check for the existence of a bid at that point. All
that remains is to show that Algorithm 2 does not terminate until all O(Bn2) hyperplanes
containing facets of the LIP have been learnt, as this immediately implies that the algorithm
identifies the locations and weights of all bids.
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Algorithm 2 Learning Positive and Negative Bids
Initialisation:
1: Let H contain the set of hyperplanes of the form ei ·x = 0 and ei ·x = M for all i ∈ [n].
2: Update V,Q and P according to H.
3: Super query at each v ∈ V to check for bid at v and add each newly found bid to Bˆ.
Main loop:
4: while ∃ hyperplane witnesses q, q′ ∈ Q do
5: Find a hyperplane separating q and q′, as described in Section 5.2, and add it to H.
6: Update V,Q and R accordingly.
7: for each new vertex v in V do
8: Super query at v to check for bid at v and add a newly found bid to Bˆ.
9: return Bˆ
I Lemma 11. Algorithm 2 learns all O(Bn2) hyperplanes containing a facet of the LIP.
Proof. In order to prove this result, it suffices to show that there exists a pair of hyperplane
witnesses if we have not learnt all hyperplanes. Suppose F is a facet of the LIP that is not
contained in any hyperplane in H. Then F separates two neighbouring demand regions.
Moreover, by assumption there is a polytope P ∈ P that intersects both these regions, hence
there exist two non-marginal points p and p′ ∈ P at which demand differs.
Next, recall that we perform a super query at every vertex of the subdivision of Rn by
the hyperplanes in H. Hence, for every polytope P ∈ P we have a query point close to its
vertices. Suppose all the query points in P demand the same bundle x. This implies that x
is also demanded at all vertices of P . By convexity of demand, x is uniquely demanded at
any non-marginal point of the polytope.
Putting the observations in the last two paragraphs together, we see that p and p′ both
lie in P and have different demand, so there exist two hyperplane witnesses in P . J
Theorem 12 gives the overall query complexity of learning a bid list with Algorithm 2.
I Theorem 12. Algorithm 2 requires O
(
Bn2 logM + 2nn!
(
Bn2
n
))
queries to learn a bid list
that may consist of positive and negative bids. For n constant, this is O (B logM +Bn).
Proof. Let H,V and Q be the number of hyperplanes, vertices and query points in the
sets H,V and Q at the conclusion of Algorithm 2. Note that Algorithm 2 only makes
demand queries in Steps 3, 5 and 8. We first count the number of queries that arise from
checking for existence of a bid at vertex locations (Steps 3 and 8). H is initialised with
2n axis-aligned hyperplanes and learns an additional O(Bn2) hyperplanes (cf. Lemma 11).
Hence H = O(Bn2). As every vertex in V arises as the intersection of n distinct hyperplanes,
we have V = O
((
Bn2
n
))
. The algorithm performs a super query of cost 2nn! at each vertex
in V, leading to a total cost of
O
(
2nn!
(
Bn2
n
))
. (3)
Next we count the number of queries required to find new hyperplanes (Step 5). Section 5.2
tells us that finding a single hyperplane costs O(logM + 2nn!) queries. As the algorithm
learns O(Bn2) hyperplanes, the aggregate number of queries performed by Step 5 is
O
(
Bn2 (logM + 2nn!)
)
. (4)
Summing (3) and (4) gives the desired query complexity for Algorithm 2. J
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6 Lower Bounds
In this section we describe lower bounds for the complexity of learning bid lists. We first
show that learning B positive bids requires Ω(B logM) queries. Our other lower bounds
apply in the setting where the bid list may comprise positive and negative bids and make use
of a carefully constructed ‘island gadget’ that consists of 2n positive and 2n negative bids.
For bid lists B that need not be valid, the island gadget immediately implies that Ω ((M4 )n)
queries are required to learn B (roughly, price-space has to be queried exhaustively). For
the case with valid bid lists, we construct an adversarial game to obtain a lower bound of
Ω
((
(B − 2n+1)/8n2)n) on the query complexity. We see that n must be held constant for
the query complexity to be polynomial. In this regime, our lower bounds and the upper
bounds from Section 5 imply a query complexity of Θ(B logM +Bn) for constant n.
I Theorem 13. Any algorithm for learning bid lists requires Ω(B logM) queries.
Proof. Consider a game in which the adversary places B positive bids at B integral points
in {(x1, 0, . . . , 0) | x1 ∈ [M ]0}). By a standard decision tree argument, any algorithm must
make Ω(B logM) queries to learn where the bids have been placed. J
6.1 The Island Gadget
We now introduce the island gadget, which allows us to locally change the demand corres-
pondence without affecting demand outside the convex hull of the gadget bids. This is
illustrated in Figure 3. Lemma 15 establishes that the gadget only influences demand locally.
Let ρ(x) denote the weight function that assigns positive weight 1 to bids with an even
number of odd entries and negative weight −1 otherwise.
I Definition 14. The gadget G at position 0 consists of the following 2n+1 positive and
negative unit bids that sit on the vertices of two unit hyper-cubes. The bids on the first
hyper-cube lie at b ∈ {0, 1}n and have weight ρ(b). The bids on the second hyper-cube lie
at b ∈ {2, 3}n and have weight −ρ(b). In order to place G at position x, we add x to the
position of each bid (without changing the weights).
I Lemma 15. The bids of gadget G placed at position x demand nothing at prices p 6∈ x+[3]n0 .
The proof of Lemma 15 makes use of the following technical result.
I Lemma 16. Let c ∈ Rn be a constraint vector. If ci ≥ 1 for some i ∈ [n], then the number
of vectors with an even number of 1 entries in {x ∈ {0, 1}n | x ≤ c} is equal to the number
of vectors with an odd number of 1 entries.
Proof. Induction on n. J
Proof of Lemma 15. Recall that gadget G at position x consists of the bids b ∈ x+ {0, 1}n
of weight ρ(b− x) and the bids b ∈ x + {2, 3}n of weight −ρ(b− x). In order to prove that
the bids of G do not aggregately demand items of any goods at prices p 6∈ x + [3]n0 , we show
for every good i and every such price that the number of negative and positive gadget bids
demanding i at p is the same.
Fix a good i ∈ [n] and prices p 6∈ x+ [0, 3]n. Without loss of generality, we assume that p
is non-marginal and pi 6= pj for all i, j ∈ [n]. Recall that an integral bid b uniquely demands
good i at p if and only if we have bi > pi and bi − pi > bj − pj for all j ∈ [n] \ {i}. The last
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Figure 3 A demand correspondence with (right) and without (left) an island gadget placed
at (2, 2). The gadget consists of the eight bids contained in the convex region denoted by the red
dotted lines. Note that demand differs only at prices inside inside this region.
condition can be rewritten as bi − bj > pi − pj . Hence we can express the set of bids in the
bottom and top cube that (uniquely) demand a positive or negative item of good i as
{b ∈ x + {0, 1}n | bi > pi and bi − bj > pi − pj , ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i}}, (5)
and {b ∈ x + {2, 3}n | bi > pi and bi − bj > pi − pj , ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i}}, (6)
respectively. We show by case distinction on the possible value of pi that the number of
positive and negative bids in (5) and (6) is equal.
Case I: Suppose first that pi 6∈ x + [3]n0 . If pi > xi + 3, the two sets (5) and (6) are
empty and we are done. Hence assume that pi < xi. Then we can express (5) and (6) as
x + {v ∈ {0, 1}n | vi − vj > pi − pj , ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i}}
and
x + 2e[n] + {v ∈ {0, 1}n | vi − vj > pi − pj , ∀j ∈ [n] \ {i}}.
We see that there is a one-to-one correspondence b→ b + 2e[n] between bids in (5) and
(6) that preserves the number of odd entries in the bid vectors. A bid b in the bottom cube
is positive if and only if b− x has an even number of odd entries and the reverse is true for
the top cube. Hence the total number of positive and negative bids in (5) and (6) is equal.
Case II: Suppose that pi ∈ [xi, xi + 3]. Then there exists a good k ∈ [n] \ {i} with
pk < xk or pk > xk+3. We proceed by further case distinction. Note that bi−bj ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
for all gadget bids b.
Case II.1: Suppose pi − pj ≥ 1 for some j ∈ [n] \ {i}. Then the sets (5) and (6) are
empty, as the constraint bi − bj > pi − pj is violated.
Case II.2: Now suppose pi − pj < 1 for every j ∈ [n] \ {i} and we have a non-empty
set K of indices k for which 0 < pi − pk < 1. Then for all bids b in (5) and (6) we have
bi − bk = 1 for all k ∈ K. Hence bi and bk can only take one value.
If K = [n] \ {i}, this implies that (5) and (6) both contain a single bid of odd parity
and we are done. If K ⊂ [n] \ {i}, then for j 6∈ K we have pi − pj < 0 and the constraint
bi − bj > pi − pj holds vacuously, so bj can take any value. We apply Lemma 16 to see that
(5) and (6) each contain an equal number of positive and negative bids.
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Case II.3: Suppose pj > pi for all j ∈ [n]\{i}. Then there exists a good k ∈ [n]\{i} such
that pk > x+ 3. We consider the two subsets {b ∈ (5) | bi = xi} and {b ∈ (5) | bi = xi + 1}
of (5) separately. If b is a bid in the first subset, then bi = xi and bi > pi imply that
pi − pk < −1, so there is no constraint on the value of bk. If b is a bid in the second subset,
then there is no constraint on the value of bk. Hence in both cases each subset is either
empty or contains an equal number of positive and negative bids by Lemma 16. J
6.2 A Lower Bound for Positive and Negative Bids
From now on, we assume that the unknown bid list may comprise positive and negative bids.
We primarily consider the setting where the bid list is assumed to be valid and specify an
adversarial game where the adversary can force the player to make Ω
((
B−2n+1
8n2
)n)
queries.
Note that this yields a query complexity of Ω(Bn) if n is constant. A similar but simpler
adversarial game is then applied to obtain a lower bound for the setting where the bid list
may be invalid. The resulting lower bounds for bid lists comprising positive and negative
bids are stated in Theorem 20.
Fix a parameter k ∈ N and let M = 4k. The adversary positions the island gadget
consisting of 2n+1 bids at exactly one of kn possible points x of the lattice 4[k − 1]n0 . He
also places boundary bids of weight 1 on the boundary of the M -cube as follows. For every
good i ∈ [n], there are M positive bids at all points mei with m ∈ [M − 1]0, and for every
pair of goods (i, j) ∈ [n]2 with i 6= j, there are M positive bids at all points mei +Mej with
m ∈ [M − 1]0. Hence, in total, the adversary creates a bid list with B = 2n+1 + 4k
(
n+
(
n
2
))
positive and negative bids. The player wishes to identify where the adversary placed the
gadget. Lemma 15 shows that placing the gadget at x only influences demand at prices
inside the cube x + [3]n0 . Hence the player must make queries inside at least kn − 1 cubes to
determine where the gadget was placed. Lemma 17 shows that the bid list created by the
adversary is valid. This leads to the lower bounds stated in Theorem 20.
I Lemma 17. The bids placed by the adversary are valid.
Recall that BG denotes the bids of the island gadget. In order to prove Lemma 17, we
define the subset BGi of BG that contains all bids indifferent between a good i and the reject
good at some fixed price vector p. The subset of bids indifferent between two non-reject
goods i and j is defined similarly, albeit separately for the ‘lower’ and the ‘upper’ cube of
the gadget. Specifically, we define
BGi := {b ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {2, 3}n | bi = pi and bk ≤ pk, ∀k ∈ [n]} (7)
as well as
BLij := {b ∈ {0, 1}n | bi ≥ pi, bj = bi − pi + pj and bk ≤ bi − pi + pk ∀k 6∈ {i, j}} (8)
BUij := {b ∈ {2, 3}n | bi ≥ pi, bj = bi − pi + pj and bk ≤ bi − pi + pk ∀k 6∈ {i, j}}. (9)
I Lemma 18. Let n ≥ 3 and p ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {2, 3}n. The sum of the weights of the gadget
bids indifferent between i and the reject good 0 p is −1, 0 or 1.
Proof. Suppose first that p ∈ {0, 1}n. We show that the sum of the weights of bids in BGi is
0 or 1. Recalling the definition of BGi from (7), note that if pk = 0 for all k 6= i, then b = 0
is the only bid in this set and its weight is positive. If we have pk = 1 for some k 6= i, then
the set contains an equal number of positive and negative bids by Lemma 16. Similarly, we
can show that the sum of the weights of bids in BGi is −1 or 0 when p ∈ {2, 3}n. J
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I Lemma 19. Let n ≥ 3 and p ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {2, 3}n. If BLij has more than one bid, the sum
of the weights of the bids indifferent between i and j is 0 or 1. Similarly, if BUij has more
than one bid, the sum of the respective bid weights is −1 or 0.
Proof. We prove the claim for BLij ; the proof for BUij is identical. Note that in order for BLij
to contain any bids, we must have p ∈ {0, 1}n.
Suppose pi = 1. Then for any bid b ∈ BLij , the values of bi and bj are constrained to bi = 1
and bj = pj . Moreover, the values of bk are constrained by bk ≤ pk. Hence for BLij to contain
at least two bids, we must have pk = 1 for some k 6∈ {i, j}, allowing bk to take values 0 and
1. Lemma 16 implies that BLij contains an equal number of positive and negative bids.
Now suppose pi = 0. Then bi can take value 0 or 1 and we consider the two subsets of BLij
where bi takes each value separately. Let S := {b ∈ BLij | bi = 0} and T := {b ∈ BLij | bi = 1}.
By definition, b is a bid in S if bi = 0, bj = pj and bk ≤ pk. By the same argument
as above, S either contains a single positive bid at bj = pj and bk = 0 for all k 6= i, or it
contains an equal number of positive and negative bids.
Finally, note that b is a bid in T if bi = 1, bj = 1 + pj and bk ≤ 1 + pk for all k ∈ [n]. The
last constraint is vacuous as it holds for all possible values of bk and pk. Hence T is empty
if pj = 1 and contains an equal number of positive and negative bids otherwise. Together,
these properties of S and T imply the claim. J
Proof of Lemma 17. Suppose that gadget G is placed at x. We apply Theorem 3 to prove
the claim. Moreover, we can use a result given by Lemma B.10 in [1] to restrict ourselves
to checking the validity criterion in Theorem 3 only at a finite number of price points (see
[1], Appendix B for details). In our case, it suffices to verify the conditions for each vertex
p ∈ x + {0, 1}n and p ∈ x + {2, 3}n.
Fix p ∈ x + {0, 1}n ∪ {2, 3}n and distinct goods i, j ∈ [n]0. We consider first the case
where i = 0 and j ∈ [n]. By Lemma 18, the sum of weights of the gadget bids indifferent
between 0 and j is at least −1. Secondly, by construction of the adversarial game, there is a
gadget bid at piei and this bid is indifferent between i and the reject good. Hence the total
sum of weights of the bids in the game indifferent between i and rejecting is at least 0.
Now let i, j be distinct (non-reject) goods in [n]. Note that b ∈ {0, 1}n is indifferent
between i and j at p, then b′ = b + 2 ∈ x + {2, 3}n is also indifferent between i and j.
Moreover, b and b′ have opposite weights. This fact, together with Lemma 19, implies that
the sum of the weights of the gadget bids is at least −1. Again, note that for any p there is
a boundary bid that is indifferent between i and j. Indeed, recall that a bid is indifferent
between i and j if and only if bi− bj = pi− pj , bi ≥ pi and bk − pk ≤ bi− pi. If pi ≥ pj , then
the bid Mei + (M − (pi − pj))ej satisfies these conditions. Similarly, if pi < pj , then the bid
(M − (pi − pj))ei −Mej satisfies this condition. As this bid is present by construction of
the adversarial game, we see that the total sum of weights of all bids that are indifferent
between i and j in the game is at least 0 in all cases. J
I Theorem 20. Let B be a bid list that may comprise positive and negative bids. If B is
valid, any algorithm requires Ω
((
B−2n+1
8n2
)n)
queries to learn B. If B is allowed to be invalid,
Ω
(
(M4 )n
)
queries are required.
Proof. Consider first the case where B is valid. Let B be the adversary’s bid list, which is
valid by Lemma 17. By Lemma 15, we know that the gadget placed at x does not affect
demand outside the cube x+[3]n0 . Hence by a standard decision tree argument, any algorithm
requires kn−1 queries to learn the location of the gadget G. Note that the adversary places a
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total of B ≤ 2n+1 + 8kn2 gadget and boundary bids. Solving for k gives k ≥ B−2n+18n2 . Hence
expressing the query complexity of kn − 1 in terms of B and n yields the desired expression.
For the case where B may be invalid, we construct an even simpler adversarial game,
where the adversary positions the island gadget as above but places no boundary bids. By
the same argument, learning the location of the gadget incurs at least Ω
(
(M4 )n
)
queries. J
Using the fact that max{f, g} = Ω(f + g) for any positive functions f and g, we can
combine the lower bounds from Theorem 13 and Theorem 20, along with the upper bound
from Algorithm 2 in Section 5, to identify the query complexity of expressing SS demand by
means of positive and negative bids.
I Corollary 21. For constant n, learning SS demand requires Θ(Bn +B logM) queries.
7 Conclusions
Our algorithms for learning demand are conceptually simple and provide the first systematic
approach for bidders to express their preferences in the bidding language used by the Product-
Mix Auction. This allows bidders with non-technical backgrounds to participate in these
auctions under the mild assumption that they are able to answer demand oracle queries. In
the setting where demand can be expressed using positive bids only, our algorithm achieves
linear query complexity. When demand may only be expressible using positive and negative
bids, our hyperplane finding algorithm performs well if the number of goods is not too large.
Our results naturally suggest multiple avenues for future work. While our lower bound
results rule out the possibility of a polynomial-time algorithm for learning bid lists in the
general case, one question of interest is whether our linear-cost algorithm for learning positive
bids can be adapted to the case where the number of negative bids is bounded by a constant.
Another immediate research question is to explore randomised learning algorithms, which
may be able to achieve better query complexity with reasonable performance guarantees.
It would also be of great interest to explore the notion of approximately learning demand
correspondences, particularly from the perspective of bidders who mistakenly report a demand
that is not SS. Relaxing the objective of exactly learning the correspondence may also allow
for better query guarantees.
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